Reconciling \u3cem\u3eEx Post Facto\u3c/em\u3e Analysis and Straddle Offenses: Alternative Approaches to Incomplete Crimes in \u3cem\u3eCommonwealth v. Rose\u3c/em\u3e by Ferris, Devon F.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 54 
Number 2 Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 
Procedure: Appreciating the Past and 
Anticipating the Future: Symposium Articles 
Article 5 
2016 
Reconciling Ex Post Facto Analysis and Straddle Offenses: 
Alternative Approaches to Incomplete Crimes in Commonwealth 
v. Rose 
Devon F. Ferris 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Devon F. Ferris, Reconciling Ex Post Facto Analysis and Straddle Offenses: Alternative Approaches to 
Incomplete Crimes in Commonwealth v. Rose, 54 Duq. L. Rev. 451 (2016). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol54/iss2/5 
This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Reconciling Ex Post Facto Analysis and Straddle
Offenses: Alternative Approaches to Incomplete
Crimes in Commonwealth v. Rose
Devon F. Ferris*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 451
II. THE COMMON LAW FOUNDATION OF THE Ex POST
FACTO CLAUSE .................................. 454
III. CALDER V. BULL AND THE SUBSEQUENT UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE
CALDER CATEGORIES .............. ............... 457
IV. RECONCILING INHERENT DISPARITIES BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL Ex POST FACTO ANALYSIS ......... 462
V. COMMONWEALTH V. ROSE .. .................... 466
VI. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMONWEALTH V.
ROSE .......................... ................ 474
A. Straddle Offenses and the Competing
Approaches to Ex Post Facto Laws .................. 474
1. The Completion Approach .......... 476
2. The Continuing Offense Approach ....... 479
3. Best Approach for Commonwealth v.
Rose................ ............ 480
B. Examining the Plain Language of the
Calder Categories in Light of the Proper
Straddle Crime Approach ................ 481
1. Criminal Acts Are Not Synonymous
With Completed Crimes ..... ....... 482
2. Abrogation of the Year and a Day
Rule..... ........ ............... 486
C. Double Jeopardy Analysis and the Ex Post
Facto Clause ...................... ..... 487
VIII. CONCLUSION .................................... 490
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the act of throwing a ball. When is the "throw" com-
plete? When the thrower ceases the act of throwing, or when the
451
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ball comes to rest? The former bases its conclusion on the premise
that the throw's completeness is directly tied to the act of throwing,
while the latter presumes that the result is what determines the
completed nature of the throw.
Apply this concept to a criminal defendant. When he sets into
motion a chain of events, he is then responsible for every crime that
may flow from those events, so long as the chain itself remains un-
broken. Legal issues develop, however, when the criminal action
and its resulting crime are separated by the passage of time. Laws
can change, potentially giving rise to ex post facto violations. The
question is: should the prohibition on ex post facto laws attach when
the criminal acts are completed, or when the crime itself results?
Ex post facto laws are most commonly associated with the crimi-
nalization of an act that was innocent when done,2 reflecting the
common law abhorrence of laws that retroactively attach a penalty
to an action without affording citizens proper notice of that pen-
alty.3 The United States Supreme Court expanded upon these con-
cepts in Calder v. Bull4 in 1798, setting forth the four kinds of laws
that are ex post facto in nature, in what is now known as "the Cal-
der categories."5 For example, when a law increases the penalty of
a crime after its commission, the law violates the ex post facto
clause as applied to any defendant who committed his crime prior
to the legislation's enactment.6 But what happens when the crimi-
nal acts are completed, yet the crime itself is not?7 Seemingly, the
Calder categories, which operate as the firmly established founda-
tion for ex post facto jurisprudence, would conflict with one another.
1. Taylor Wofford, Will John Hinckley Jr. Face Murder Charges for the 'Delayed Death'
of James Brady?, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/will-john-hinckley-
jr-face-murder-charges-delayed-death-james-brady-263716.
2. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *46 ("[W]hen after an action (indifferent in itself) is commit-
ted, the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a pun-
ishment upon the person who has committed it.").
3. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *45-46.
4. 3 U.S. at 390.
5. See Id.
6. Id. (specifically referring to the third Calder category).
7. J. Richard Broughton, On Straddle Crimes and the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 719, 725 (2011). In his article, Broughton questions whether the language of
the Calder categories "refers merely to a completed course of [criminal] conduct ... or
whether it refers to any affirmative act on the part of the defendant that pre-dates a new law
that makes that act an element of a crime." Id. Broughton's article addresses this issue
solely with respect to the first Calder category. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. This article focuses
on the third Calder category's "criminal act" versus "completed crime" debate, and will ana-
lyze the facts of Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015), petition for cert. docketed,
No. 15-1036 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2016), in light of that conclusion.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently addressed this is-
sue in Commonwealth v. Rose,8 a case involving the death of a
woman fourteen years after she was beaten into a coma.9 As the
victim lay in a vegetative state, the Pennsylvania legislature
amended the sentencing scheme for third-degree murder, increas-
ing it from a mandatory sentence of ten to twenty years of impris-
onment10 to a mandatory sentence of twenty to forty years of im-
prisonment.11 When the victim succumbed to her injuries more
than ten years after they were inflicted, the two men who attacked
her were exposed to criminal liability for her death.12
After one of the co-defendants was found guilty of third-degree
murder and sentenced under the new sentencing regime, the ques-
tion became whether this sentence was a violation of the state1 3 and
federal ex post facto clauses.14 The facts of Rose present what has
been described as a "straddling offense": the defendant completed
one or more elements of the crime before the alleged ex post facto
law was enacted, and satisfied the remaining elements after the
law's effective date.15 In Rose, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that, under Calder, an ex post facto violation exists when all of
the criminal actions are done prior to the legislation's enactment,
regardless of whether the crime itself is completed.16 According to
the court, Rose was unconstitutionally sentenced under the new,
more punitive statute, and the sentence in place at the time he com-
mitted his criminal acts should have controlled.17
The facts of Rose are best equated to the act of throwing a ball.
Although the defendant's actions were completed at the time of the
attack, the result had not yet come to fruition; the ball had not yet
ceased to roll. This article endeavors to explain why the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court's holding in Rose incorrectly focuses on the
8. 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015), petition for cert. docketed, No. 15-1036 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2016).
9. Id. at 796.
10. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103(1) (1972); see generally Commonwealth v. Domingo Soto,
1990 WL 902476 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 1990).
11. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §1102(d) (1995).
12. Rose, 127 A.3d at 796-97.
13. PA. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of
contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be
passed."). "Ex post facto" is a Latin phrase that translates to "after the fact," but the Supreme
Court of the United States has defined an ex post facto law as "penal statutes which disad-
vantage the offender affected by them." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990) (citing
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1798)).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.").
15. Broughton, supra note 7, at 720.




completion of the criminal acts instead of on the completion of the
actual crime.18 The plain language, purpose, and traditional inter-
pretation of the ex post facto clause and the accompanying Calder
categories dictate that a completed crime is required to invoke the
prohibition against ex post facto laws in the context of the third
Calder category.
Parts II and III of this article set out the common law foundation
of the ex post facto clause and the subsequent United States Su-
preme Court interpretation of the clause. Part IV addresses everal
important distinctions between state and federal ex post facto
cases, namely the lack of coextensivity in the analysis. Part V ex-
plains the facts of Rose and the accompanying opinions from the
Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Courts. Part VI sets forth the
analysis that this article argues is more appropriate for the issue
presented in Rose, including (1) looking to the plain language of the
Calder categories; (2) analyzing the case under one of the competing
approaches to straddle offenses, either the Completion Approach1 9
or the Continuing Offense Approach;20 and (3) turning to double
jeopardy cases for guidance. As this article concludes in Part VII,
the increased sentencing statute at issue in Rose does not implicate
the ex post facto clause, because his crime was incomplete at the
time of the law's enactment. Where a defendant could not have
been charged with a crime under the old law, applying a new stat-
ute to him does not violate the ex post facto clause.
II. THE COMMON LAW FOUNDATION OF THE Ex POST FACTO
CLAUSE
The Latin phrase "ex post facto" has been defined as "[d]one or
made after the fact; having retroactive force or effect."21 It follows
that an ex post facto law is one that is enacted, or "done," after the
18. Id. The court stated:
[F]or purposes of an ex post facto inquiry, the Commonwealth's focus on the result of
an individual's criminal acts-in this case, the death of the victim-is misplaced. Ra-
ther, we hold that, where a crime requires both a criminal act and a subsequent result
(e.g., a homicide), the imposition of a more severe sentence based on a statute that was
amended after the act was committed, but prior to the result of that act, violates the
ex post facto prohibition.
Id.
19. Broughton, supra note 7, at 727; see infra Part VIAL.
20. Broughton, supra note 7, at 731; see infra Part VI.A.2.
21. Ex post facto, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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fact, so as to retroactively apply to some conduct or event that oc-
curred prior to the enactment.22 The abhorrence of retroactive leg-
islation dates back to Greco-Roman society,23 and the bias against
retroactive laws is clearly evidenced in the thirteenth-century Eng-
lish common law treatise by Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws of England.24 Blackstone's Commentaries relies heav-
ily on Roman jurisprudence25 to lay the foundation for the two pur-
poses that came to underlie the prohibition of ex post facto clause:
(1) to provide the public fair notice of new laws and their accompa-
nying punishments,26 and (2) to protect the public against vindictive
government legislation.27
According to Blackstone, without proper notice of the law through
"some external sign," the legislation is never properly law.2 8 Black-
stone refers to the objectionable practice used by the Roman Em-
peror, Caligula, to illustrate the necessity of notifying the public of
new laws:2 9 Caligula would write laws in small text, and post the
laws high on pillars, making it difficult for citizens to see and un-
derstand them.30 Caligula "effectually . . . ensnare[d]" the Roman
people by making it impossible to know the law, therefore making
it impossible to follow the law.3 1
22. Note that while every "ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective ... every
retrospective law is not an ex post facto law." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798). While
there is overlap between retroactivity and ex post facto arguments, an ex post facto claim
requires more than a mere retroactive application of a statute; it must also disadvantage the
defendant. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
23. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, 39 IDAHO
L. REV. 489, 499-500 (2003). Natelson provides several Roman maxims that evidence the
early distaste for retroactive laws: "What the law permits in the past, it bans for the future";
"[n]o one can change his plan to the injury of another"; and "[tlhe penalty for a past wrong is
never increased ex post facto." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Framers
were "intensely interested in Roman law, ideas, and examples [and American] common law
and equity ... ha[s] borrowed liberally from [the Romans]." Id.
24. Wayne A. Logan, "Democratic Despotism"and Constitutional Constraint: An Empir-
ical Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 439,
444 (2004) (citing Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Prin-
ciple of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775, 775-77 (1936)).
25. Natelson, supra note 23, at 499.
26. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *45; see also Broughton, supra note 7, at 752.
27. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *46.
28. Id. at *45 (a rule of law must be "prescribed," because "a bare resolution, confined in
the breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself by some external sign, can never be
properly a law").
29. Id.; see also Broughton, supra note 7, at 751.
30. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *46; see also Broughton, supra note 7, at 751.
31. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *46.
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Yet Blackstone believed ex post facto laws to be "an even 'more
unreasonable method' than Caligula's."32 Blackstone explained
that when an action is declared a crime after it was innocently com-
mitted, punishing the actor for "not abstaining [from that action] is
'cruel and unjust."' 33 Because the actor was not on notice of the
illegality of his action or the punishment attached thereto, he had
no reason to abstain from the act.34 According to Blackstone, "[a]ll
laws should be therefore made to commence in [the] futur[e], and
be notified before their commencement."3 5
Blackstone also worried about the potential for the legislature to
impose arbitrary or vindictive ex post facto laws, as the British Par-
liament was infamous for doing.36 The Parliament passed "legisla-
tive judgmentS"37 that declared "acts to be treason, which were not
treason[] when committed;"38 violated the rules of evidence by re-
ceiving evidence without oath, or allowing one witness to satisfy the
burden of legal proof when the law required two; 3 9 and inflicted
"greater punishment[] than the law annexed to the offence" at the
time of the crime.40 In Commentaries, Blackstone recognized the
twin purposes underlying the prohibition of ex post facto laws: pro-
tecting against vindictive legislation, and providing fair notice to
citizens of the effective laws and their accompanying punish-
ments.41 These two purposes would come to shape American ex post
facto jurisprudence, evidenced by the inclusion of the ex post facto
clause in the United States Constitution, and the plain language of
the Calder categories.42
32. Broughton, supra note 7, at 751, (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *46). Note
that the traditional, most basic understanding of an ex post facto law is reflected in the first
category.
33. Broughton, supra note 7, at 752, (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *45-46).
34. Broughton, supra note 7, at 752.
35. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *45.
36. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389 (1798).
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing the case of the Earl of Strafford, in 1641).
39. Id. (citing the case of Sir John Fenwick, in 1696).
40. Id. (citing The Coventry act, in 1670 (22 & 23 Car. II. c. 1)).
41. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *45-46.
42. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (finding the purposes of the ex post
facto prohibition to be ensuring notice of punishments and protecting against vindictive leg-
islation). Compare the language of Blackstone to that of Justice Chase in Calder. Calder, 3
U.S. at 390. Blackstone states an ex post facto law is "when after an action (indifferent in
itself) is committed, the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and
inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it." BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at
*46. The first Calder category is as follows: "Every law that makes an action, done before
the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such
action." Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. The language and sentence structure of Blackstone's defini-
tion and the first Calder category are nearly identical, further showing the immense influ-
ence Blackstone had on American Constitutional jurisprudence and the interpretation of the
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III. CALDER V. BULL AND THE SUBSEQUENT UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE CALDER CATEGORIES
Article 1, Section 9 of the United States Constitution states that
"[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed" under
federal law,4 3 and Article 1, Section 10 extends this prohibition to
state laws.44 The Framers of the Constitution included this prohi-
bition on "after-the-fact laws" or "retroactive legislation" to ensure
that federal and state legislators could not enact laws that would
oppress the citizens of the newly formed United States.45 Although
the drafters of the Constitution generally agreed46 that ex post facto
laws went against "every principle of sound legislation"47 and are
among the "most formidable instruments of tyranny,"4 8 the Fram-
ers still debated whether or not to include the ex post facto clause.4 9
Some believed a provision prohibiting ex post facto laws was unnec-
essary because such laws were so obviously unenforceable.5 0 In the
end, however, the Framers included the clause as a precautionary
measure.51
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, the ex post facto
clause, "naked and without explanation . .. is unintelligible, and
means nothing."52 Justice Samuel Chase provided the necessary
context and interpretation of the clause in the seminal ex post facto
ex post facto clause. This suggests we should harken back to Blackstone and the foundational
purposes of the ex post facto clause when interpreting modern cases. See discussion infra
Part VI.B.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 3.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10 cl. 1.
45. Danielle Kitson, It's an Ex Post Fact: Supreme Court Misapplies the Ex Post Facto
Clause to Criminal Procedure Statutes, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 430 (2001); see
also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 216 (1827) (The Framers included the ex post facto
clause "in order to restrain the State legislatures from oppressing individuals by arbitrary
sentences, clothed with the forms of legislation, and from making retrospective laws applica-
ble to criminal matters."). The ex post facto prohibition is only concerned with legislative
acts, not judicial decisions. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001) (rejecting the ar-
gument that because both the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses protect the interests
of fundamental fairness and prevention of arbitrary and vindictive legislation, the constructs
of the ex post facto clause should similarly apply to judicial construction).
46. Broughton, supra note 7, at 750 (internal citations omitted). See also Natelson, supra
note 23, at 517-22.
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 3 (James Madison); see also Broughton, supra note 7, at
751.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Broughton, supra note
7, at 751.
49. Broughton, supra note 7, at 750.
50. Id. (citing James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 22, 1787)).
51. Id.
52. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
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case, Calder v. Bull,53 which would supply the framework for ex post
facto interpretation to date.54 The Supreme Court's interpretation
in Calder upholds the original intent of the clause: to provide the
public with notice of the consequences of unlawful behavior, and
protect the public from arbitrary or vindictive legislation.
In Calder, Justice Chase "endeavour[s] to show what law is to be
considered an ex post facto law," as the text itself requires "some
explanation"55 of the scope of the clause.5 6 The Calder decision not
only established that the ex post facto clause "unquestionably refers
to crimes, and nothing else,"5 7 but also reiterates that the clause's
purpose is "to protect [citizens] from punishment by legislative acts,
having a retrospective operation."5 8 Thus, the Calder decision so-
lidified English common law and Blackstone's Commentaries as the
foundation for analyzing ex post facto cases in the United States.
53. 3 U.S. 386 (1798). In Calder, a Connecticut probate court issued a decree disapprov-
ing of and refusing to record a will, which the Bulls stood to inherit. Id. at 386. Two years
later, the Connecticut legislature set aside this decree and ordered a new hearing regarding
the disputes surrounding the will. Id. The Calder's argued that applying the resolution of
the legislature to the 1793 decree was an ex post facto violation. Id. The unanimous decision
of the United States Supreme Court held that the ex post facto clause was not implicated
because it only applied to criminal laws. Id. at 399 ("the true construction of the prohibition
extends to criminal, not to civil, cases").
54. See Calder, 3 U.S. 386.
55. Id. at 390.
56. Broughton, supra note 7, at 721. Calder limits the scope of the ex post facto clause
to criminal laws, though there is debate among scholars regarding whether this is dicta or
not. See infra note 58.
57. Calder, 3 U.S. at 396.
58. Id. at 390. There has been some debate over whether the Calder court's limitation of
ex post facto violations to criminal legislation is dicta. Andrew J. Gottman, Fair Notice, Even
for Terrorists: Timothy McVeigh and a New Standard for the Ex Post Facto Clause, 56 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 591, 599 (1999) (citing Laura Ricciardi & Michael B.W. Sinclair, Retroactive
Civil Legislation, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 301, 321 (1996) (stating the Calder limitation of the ex
post facto clause to criminal law was dicta)). Commentators rely on two cases to illustrate
this point: Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810), and Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866).
The Fletcher decision did not reference Calder nor the categories created there within, but
used the ex post facto clause and the Contracts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, to
invalidate a civil statute revoking fraudulent land grants. Gottman, supra at 600. The
Fletcher Court held that an ex post facto violation could exist when a civil law retroactively
repeals "absolute rights [that] have vested under [a] contract." Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 135; see
generally Gottman, supra at 600.
In Cummings, the Supreme Court invalidated a loyalty oath that citizens were re-
quired to take before holding certain offices of employment. Cummings, 71 U.S. at 316; see
also Gottman, supra at 601 n.72. Although this was a civil amendment with no criminal
penalties, the Supreme Court found that there was a "punitive purpose" underlying the oath.
Gottman, supra at 602. Given the post-Civil War context, the Court found that the legislative
intent in imposing the oath was to "punish Confederate sympathizers." Id.; see Cummings,
71 U.S. at 328-32. While some read Fletcher and Cummings to expand the applicability of
the ex post facto clause to civil legislation, allegedly turning the assertion in Calder that the
clause only extends to criminal statutes into dicta, both cases are actually in line with recent
ex post facto jurisprudence. In both cases, it was "the effect, not the form, of the law that
determine[d] whether it [was] ex post facto." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 (1981).
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The Calder decision inaugurated the four categories of laws that
serve as a threshold in determining whether there is an ex post
facto violation. The four categories are:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action.59
2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed.60
3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed.61
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and re-
ceives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the
offender.62
These laws, "and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppres-
sive,"6 3 and are viewed as expressly prohibited by the Constitu-
tion.64 The Framers described the ex post facto clause as a provision
they "considered to be 'perhaps greater securities to liberty and re-
publicanism than any [the Constitution] contains."'65 The clause
"imposes a requirement of notice consistent with the principle of
legality" by requiring that the legislature provide fair notice of any
intent to "treat conduct as criminal so that individuals may ensure
that their actions conform to law. "66 This, in turn, protects against
Because the civil laws involved in Fletcher and Cummings were held to be punitive in their
effect, the application of such laws gave rise to ex post facto violations. Thus, the focus of a
law, though civil in nature, may still constitute an unconstitutional ex post facto law.
59. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. This is the quintessential ex post facto example. An innocent
act is later criminalized, and the law attempts to reach "backward in time, before its enact-
ment, in order to punish." Broughton, supra note 7, at 752. This category focuses exclusively
on the criminalization of past acts; such acts are not considered criminal when carried out.
Perhaps because this category is so often what is associated with ex post facto claims, there
is a misconception that the categories are all "acts based." See discussion infra Part VI.B.
60. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 391.
64. Id.
65. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521 (2000) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 511
(Alexander Hamilton)).
66. Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal
Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 463 (2001); see also United States v. Lanier, 520
U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (describing the fair notice requirement as a bar on courts' application of
a "novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior
459
460 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 54
any attempts by the government to impose arbitrary or vindictive
legislation,6 7 thus furthering the two common law purposes of the
ex post facto bar put forth by Blackstone.
More than two hundred years after Calder, courts still follow the
categorical framework it established, thus protecting against com-
mon law concerns that created the ex post facto clause.6 8 Courts
and commentators alike have read the ex post facto clause and its
interpretive Calder categories as serving three main functions:69 (1)
to ensure citizens are provided fair notice of crimes and their ac-
companying punishments;70 (2) to protect citizens from arbitrary or
vindictive legislation;7 1 and (3) to protect the separation of powers.7 2
While all three of these purposes are in line with the traditional
interpretation of the ex post facto clause, courts have made clear
that the "fundamental principle" of the clause is the fair notice re-
quirement.73
Recent United States Supreme Court ex post facto cases have
been decided in accordance with these purposes.74 In Weaver v.
judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope"). Note how this quote and logic
seems to relate most applicably to the acts-based first Calder category.
67. The two policy purposes protected by the ex post facto clause-providing fair notice
and abhorrence of vindictive legislation-go hand in hand: "The Clause does not prohibit the
passage of arbitrary or vindictive legislation generally, but only legislation that is arbitrary
or vindictive on account of its retroactive application." Andrew C. Adams, One-Book, Two
Sentences: Ex Post Facto Considerations of the One-Book Rule After United States v. Kumar,
39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 231, 236 (2012); see Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
68. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29 (finding the purpose of the ex post facto clause to en-
sure that laws provide "fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their
meaning until explicitly changed").
69. Kitson, supra note 45, at 432-33; see also Derek J. T. Adler, Ex Post Facto Limitations
on Changes in Evidentiary Law: Repeal of Accomplice Corroboration Requirements, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 1191, 1196-97 (1987); David S. DeMatteo, Welcome to Anytown, U.S.A.-
Home of Beautiful Scenery (and a Convicted Sex Offender): Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Laws in E.B. v. Verniero, 43 VILL. L. REV. 581, 595 (1998); Wayne A. Logan, The
Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1276
(1998).
70. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *46 ("[I]t is impos-
sible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be after-
wards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstain from it;
and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and unjust.").
71. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
72. Id. at 29 n.10 (citing Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. 272, 277 (1804)) (The ex post facto
clause "upholds the separation of powers by confining the legislature to penal decisions with
prospective effect and the judiciary and executive to applications of existing penal law."); see
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 116 (5th ed. 2010) (the clause protects the separation of
powers in that it "assures the legislature can make recourse to stigmatizing penalties of the
criminal law only when its core purpose of deterrence could thereby possibly be served.").
73. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind. 2009) ("The underlying purpose of the Ex
Post Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to
fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.").
74. See, e.g., Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
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Graham,75 the high court interpreted the Calder categories and the
common law concerns surrounding ex post facto laws as requiring
two elements for a criminal law to be ex post facto: (1) it must be
retrospective, meaning the law applies to events occurring before
its enactment;76 and (2) it must disadvantage the offender in its ap-
plication.77 Although the Supreme Court has never had occasion to
address the distinction between the criminal acts referenced in the
first category and the completed crimes of the other categories, the
Court's recent decision in Peugh v. United States78 could be inter-
preted as doing just that. In Peugh, the defendant was convicted of
bank fraud for crimes completed uring 1999 and 2000.79 He was
not sentenced, however, until 2010, after the penalty for bank fraud
was increased in 2009.80 The court found that application of the
2009 Guideline to Peugh constituted a third Calder category ex post
facto law, as the new law was "promulgated after [the defendant]
committed his criminal acts."81
The primary holding of Peugh, however, was that federal sentenc-
ing guidelines-which are not mandatory82-can still implicate the
ex post facto clause, an issue that was previously debated amongst
federal courts.83 The question of whether Peugh's crime was com-
pleted at the time of the new law's enactment was not at issue; in
fact, his subsequent rial had already begun when the law became
effective.84 Thus, Peugh does not control in a case like Rose, where
the dispositive question is whether the prohibition on ex post facto
laws applies only to completed crimes. In fact, the Supreme Court's
interchangeable use of "acts," "offense," and "crime" in Peugh sug-
gests that it has not contemplated the idea that a criminal's actions
and the resultant crime may take place at distinct moments in time,
75. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
76. Id. at 29; see also id. at 29 n.11, (citing Jaehne v. New York, 128 U.S. 189, 194 (1888)
(legislation is void if it "should endeavor to reach by its retroactive operation acts before
committed")).
77. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29; see also Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937).
78. 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013).
79. Id. at 2078.
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see infra note 102.
83. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2079 (discussing United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (7th
Cir. 2006); compare Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, and United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625 (8th
Cir. 2010), with United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and United States
v. Ortiz, 621 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting the position that advisory sentencing Guidelines
cannot implicate the ex post facto clause); see also infra part IV.
84. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2078.
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and be separated by a change in the law.85 This conflation of terms
is rampant throughout United States Supreme Court ex post facto
opinions, indicating that the critical distinction inherent in these
words seems to have been lost not only on the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Rose, but also on the United States Supreme Court
as well.86
IV. RECONCILING INHERENT DISPARITIES BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL EX POST FACTO ANALYSIS
The Peugh decision brings to light some inherent issues in apply-
ing federal ex post facto analysis to any state court case. Pennsyl-
vania, like other states, has adopted the Supreme Court's require-
ments that a law must be retrospective87 and disadvantageous to
the defendant88 to constitute an ex post facto violation.89 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has strictly adhered to the Calder catego-
ries in making ex post facto determinations,90 which is the proper
method of analysis according to the Supreme Court of the United
States.91 In its prior decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has been reluctant to find ex post facto violations,92 and in some
85. See id. The court states that the question in Peugh is "whether there is an ex post
facto violation when a defendant is sentenced under Guidelines promulgated after he com-
mitted his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher applicable Guidelines sen-
tencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense." Id. (emphasis added). In
this one sentence, the court uses the words "acts" and "offense" to describe the exact same
event. Additionally, even if the Supreme Court did deliberately use these words interchange-
ably, Peugh would still be inapplicable to Rose because the crime in Peugh was not a strad-
dling offense. See discussion infra Part VI.A. The elements of bank fraud were fully satisfied
in conjunction with the criminal acts, unlike in Rose.
86. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
87. Commonwealth v. Young, 637 A.2d 1313, 1317 (Pa. 1993) ("[O]nly those retrospective
laws . . . violate the prohibition against ex post facto legislation.").
88. Id. at 1318 ("Only those laws which disadvantage a defendant ... are ex post facto
laws and constitutionally infirm.").
89. Note that the ex post facto clause does not apply to "procedural" retroactive stat-
utes-defined as any change in the "procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated"-
unless the procedural statute infringes upon a substantial right. Collins v. Youngblood, 497
U.S. 37, 45 (1990). An example of such would be a law that "affects matters of substance . .
. by depriving a defendant of substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds
the person accused . .. or arbitrarily infringing upon substantial personal rights." Id. (inter-
nal citations and quotations omitted). Because the statute involved here is not procedural in
nature, this issue will not be discussed in this article.
90. Young, 637 A.3d at 1317 (Only laws "encompassed by the Calder categories violate
the prohibition against ex post facto legislation."); id. at 1318 ("Only those laws which ...
fall within a Calder category are ex post facto laws.").
91. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 539 (2000) ("[I]t was a mistake to stray beyond Cal-
der's four categories" in previous holdings.); see Collins, 497 U.S. at 49 ("[D]eparture from
Calder's explanation of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause was, [the court
held], unjustified.").
92. See Young, 637 A.2d at 1317-18 (holding that a later-enacted law that allowed de-
fendant to be sentenced to death was not an ex post facto violation because he "faced exactly
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instances even avoided extending the protection of the clause on an
as-applied basis.93 While the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the ex post facto clause is of course a necessary consid-
eration in any ex post facto analysis,94 the outcomes of federal ex
post facto decisions must be critically evaluated in light of issues
that are only present at the federal level.
Article 1, Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that
"[n]o ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or im-
munities, shall be passed."95 This clause is almost verbatim to the
clause found in the United States Constitution,96 and the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has stated that ex post facto determinations
under both constitutions are comparable.97
But "comparable" is not necessarily identical. Closer examina-
tion of the issues involved in federal ex post facto cases-specifically
with respect to sentencing statutes that would implicate the second
and third Calder categories-presents questions about whether
complete coextensivity in ex post facto analysis truly exists between
the state and federal courts.98 In other words, presented with the
same set of facts, would a federal court rule exactly the same way
the same potential punishment" and there was no increase in his potential sentence); Dial v.
Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1, 5-6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (holding that requiring convicts to submit
DNA samples before they were released on parole was not ex post facto because the law was
not penal and was something prisoners could have reasonably contemplated); Common-
wealth v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. 1999) (finding no ex post facto violation in requiring
sex offender registration); Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 985 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2009), rev'd
on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1597 (2011) (holding that a law allowing admission of hearsay
statements from a child abuse victim was not ex post facto because it "simply expanded the
class of persons whose out-of-court statements [were] admissible," and did not alter the "type
of evidence sufficient to support a conviction.") (emphasis in original).
93. See Cimaszewski v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 868 A.2d 416, 428 (Pa. 2005) (stating that
although the law in question could violate the ex post facto clause, the defendant did not
sufficiently show that the statute created a "significant risk" of increasing his punishment).
94. For example, the Supreme Court's interpretation that a law must be retrospective,
disadvantage the defendant, and not provide fair notice is relevant both in a state and federal
law ex post facto analysis. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
95. PA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
96. Compare PA. CONST. art. I, § 17, with U.S. CONST. art I, § 9; see also Allshouse, 985
A.2d at 861 ("[The ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions
are virtually identical in language.").
97. Young, 637 A.2d at 1317 n.7; see also Commonwealth v. Rose, 81 A.3d 123, 127 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2013) (en banc), aff'd, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015) (internal citations omitted) ("Our
Supreme Court has opined that the same pre-revolutionary-war concerns shaped the ex post
facto provisions of the constitutions of Pennsylvania and the United States. Accordingly, the
standards applied to determine an ex post facto violation under the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion and the United States Constitution are comparable.").
98. See, e.g., Doe v. Dep't. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123, 136 (Md. 2013)
(refusing to follow Collins u. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), on state law grounds).
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as the state supreme court? As this section explains, complete co-
extensivity is impossible with respect to federal and state sentenc-
ing guidelines as potential ex post facto violations. State courts
must be aware of this fact when turning to federal sentencing ex
post facto cases for direction. This is true for two reasons: first, the
debate over whether federal sentencing guidelines are mandatory
or advisory has muddled the ex post facto analysis;99 and second,
federal district courts are actually required to apply the sentencing
guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing.100
First, until Peugh,1 0 1 there was substantial debate over whether
federal sentencing guidelines were mandatory or advisory, and
whether advisory guidelines could even implicate the ex post facto
clause.102 The logic was that if a law was not mandatory, then a
99. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2071, 2081 (2013); see also infra note 102. There
was also previously substantial confusion over whether the ex post facto clause applied to
statutes imposing procedural rather than substantive changes in the law, which could have
an equally drastic distorting effect on prior holdings. Collins, 497 U.S. at 45 ("We think
[language from previous Supreme Court cases] has imported confusion into the interpreta-
tion of the Ex Post Facto Clause" with respect to the procedural versus substantial debate.).
This issue, however, is outside the scope of this article as the statute in Commonwealth v.
Rose, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015), is not procedural in nature; see supra text accompanying note
66.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2012).
101. See Peugh 133 S. Ct. at 2081.
102. Adams, supra note 67 at 245-51 (stating that circuits are split over whether the post-
Booker advisory Guidelines can be applied retroactively without raising ex post facto con-
cerns). See Gregory S. Dierdorf, Yes, We Were Wrong; No, We Will Not Make It Right: The
Seventh Circuit Denies Post-Conviction Relief From An Undisputed Sentencing Error Because
It Occurred In The Post-Booker, Advisory Guidelines Era, 9 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 301, 301-04
(2014). Before 1984, judges were afforded complete discretion in sentencing defendants, cre-
ating an inconsistent application of the federal sentencing scheme. Id. at 303. See, e.g.,
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). To combat this disparity and achieve uni-
formity in federal sentencing, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3551 (2012), which created uniform federal Sentencing Guidelines. Dierdorf, supra at 304.
The Guidelines "serve as a rubric for calculating the appropriate sentencing range for 'each
category of offense involving each category of defendant."' Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1)
(2012)). The Sentencing Guidelines were originally said to be binding on all federal sentenc-
ing judges, i.e., mandatory, and thus subject to potential ex post facto violations. Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 367. See also Sarah French Russel, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress,
and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 90 (2012).
However, in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the United States Supreme
Court modified the Guidelines, making them advisory rather than mandatory to remedy the
Sixth Amendment violation disputed in Booker. Id.; see also Dierdorf, supra at 304. Now,
although a sentencing court must still consider the relevant Guidelines, the court may depart
from the recommended sentencing range so long as it explains its rationale with respect to
the sentencing factors set forth in the Guidelines. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226; see also Dierdorf,
supra at 304. The Supreme Court's imposed alteration means that the post-Booker Guide-
lines should no longer give rise to ex post facto concerns. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2081.
The recent decision in Peugh reintroduced confusion into this matter by holding that
advisory sentencing schemes may still violate the ex post facto clause because ven though
the Guidelines are more like "guideposts" than "fences," district courts are unlikely to waiver
from the guidelines, thus creating the "legally binding effect" of a mandatory sentencing
range. Id. at 2086. According to the Peugh court, because district courts must "begin their
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judge may use discretion in applying it.103 This essentially removes
the ability to prove that the law "disadvantaged [the] offender."104
If a federal district court judge may, in her discretion, increase or
decrease the defendant's sentence based on the specific facts at
hand, imposing a sentence lower than the guidelines would not dis-
advantage the defendant, and imposing a sentence higher than the
guidelines would be a "regular excessive sentence" issue.1 05 Any
further disagreement over the sentence would then be considered
error on the part of the judge, subject to the abuse of discretion
standard of review.10 6
Before Peugh, the federal courts debated whether the Guidelines
were mandatory or advisory.107 Disagreement over this threshold
determination may have skewed federal ex post facto analysis in
those cases. For example, if the facts of a case plainly indicated an
ex post facto violation in the retroactive application of a federal sen-
tencing guideline, but the reviewing court believed that advisory
laws could not be ex post facto, the court would find no violation in
retroactively applying the Guideline.10 8 However, Pennsylvania,109
along with several other states, imposes mandatory sentencing
guidelines.11 0 Thus, if one looks to federal ex post facto precedent
sentencing analysis with t e Guidelines . . . and use them to calculate the sentencing range
correctly" those Guidelines will "anchor" the district court's discretion. Id. at 2087. Justice
Scalia dissented, stating that the flexible nature of advisory sentencing guidelines could not
raise ex post facto concerns, id. at 2091 (Scalia, J., dissenting), but even if they could, the
"'risk of an increased sentence created [would not] be 'sufficient' for ex post facto purposes."
Id. at 2092.
103. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083 ("[S]entencing courts possess discretion to deviate from the
recommended sentencing range.").
104. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (to constitute an ex post facto law, the
statute "must disadvantage the offender affected by it.").
105. See generally Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2089 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 2080.
107. The disagreement over this issue is referenced in the past tense because the Peugh
decision seemingly resolves the debate by holding that while the guidelines are advisory,
they can still implicate the ex post facto clause. See generally id. at 2085-88. However, some
courts have declined to follow this holding. See, e.g., United States v. Vallone, 752 F.3d 690,
700 (7th Cir. 2014). The Seventh Circuit specifically applied the Peugh holding to a conspir-
acy straddle crime, see discussion infra Part VI, and found that Peugh was inapplicable, at
least in the context of straddling offenses. Vallone, 752 F.3d at 693-95. It is yet to be seen
whether this issue is truly resolved or not.
108. Ignoring the debate over the mandatory or advisory nature of federal sentencing
guidelines would be akin to ignoring a court's threshold determination of standard of review.
If we do not understand that the court applied strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny, it
is manifestly more difficult to understand why the law was found to be invalid.
109. 204 PA. CONS. STAT. § 303.9(h) (2014).
110. See generally Neal B. Kauder and Brian J. Ostrom, State Sentencing Guidelines: Pro-
files and Continuum, NAT'L CTR ST. CTS. (July 2008), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Micro-
sites/Files/CSI/State Sentencing Guidelines.ashx (finding that Alaska, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington all impose mandatory sen-
tencing guidelines).
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without fully understanding the underlying "mandatory versus ad-
visory" tension, a case may misleadingly appear analogous when it
is not, or vice versa.
Second, federal district courts are actually mandated to apply the
Guidelines in effect at the date of sentencing.' Indeed, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Peugh is predicated on this statute, and
the justices held that when the crime was already completed and
the sentencing guidelines were amended during the trial phase, the
district court must apply the pre-amended guidelines.112 Again, the
crimes in Peugh were not only completed when the new sentencing
guidelines were enacted, but the defendant's subsequent rial had
also already begun.113 This requirement that judges apply the sen-
tencing guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing is only a fed-
eral requirement.114
In light of the distinctions between state and federal sentencing
guidelines, complete coextensivity among the state and federal ap-
plication of the ex post facto clause is impossible. While federal ex
post facto law cases and analysis are certainly instructive, they
must be read critically with respect to their applicability to state
court cases.115 State courts should keep in mind that cases arising
within the context of the federal Guidelines implicate many issues
that are not present in state law ex post facto cases, and such issues
may skew the outcome of the federal case.
V. COMMONWEALTH V. ROSE
On July 13, 1993, Stevenson Leon Rose ("Rose") and Shawn Sadik
("Sadik") attacked Mary Mitchell ("Mitchell") in a public park in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.1 1 6 For more than twenty minutes, Rose
and Sadik beat and stomped Mitchell, kicking her approximately
sixty times, and stabbed her to the point of nearly severing her
throat.1 1 7 Rose and Sadik also shoved a sixteen-inch piece of metal
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2012).
112. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2088.
113. Id. at 2078-79.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii).
115. Because straddle offenses have only been significantly addressed on the federal level,
this article is forced to apply the logic of several federal cases in its analysis of straddle
crimes. See discussion infra Part VI.A. In the interests of candor, it is important to under-
stand the inherent limitations of that application.
116. Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 796 (Pa. 2015), petition for cert. docketed, No.
15-1036 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2016).
117. Id.
466 Vol. 54
Summer 2016 Approaches to Incomplete Crimes 467
into Ms. Mitchell's vagina before leaving her unconscious in a pool
of her own blood.118
Around 3:00 a.m. on July 13th, two men discovered Mitchell-
bleeding and naked-lying in the park.119 Mitchell was transported
by ambulance to the hospital, where doctors determined that she
was in a comatose state.120 The next morning, Pittsburgh police
officers apprehended Rose and Sadik based on evidence linking
them to Mitchell's attack.121 On September 3, 1993, Rose was
charged1 22 with criminal attempted homicide,123 aggravated as-
sault,124 involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,125 recklessly en-
dangering another person,12 6 and criminal conspiracy with Sadik.1 2 7
Following a jury trial on January 24, 1994, Rose was found guilty
on all counts, and on March 16, 1994 was sentenced to fifteen to
thirty years in prison.128
During the three months following her attack, doctors were able
to stabilize Mitchell's condition, but she remained in a nearly vege-
tative state for approximately fourteen years.129 On September 17,
2007, Mitchell died from complications related to a lack of brain
function directly resulting from the injuries she suffered in 1993 at
the hands of Rose and Sadik.130 Rose was charged with criminal
homicide on January 24, 2008,131 based on the now fatal 1993 attack
118. Commonwealth v. Rose, 81 A.3d 123, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (en banc), aff'd, 127
A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015).
119. Rose, 127 A.3d at 796.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Rose was charged in the Court of the Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Crim-
inal Division, at Docket No. CC-1993-09829.
123. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 901(a) (1972).
124. Id. at § 2702(a)(1).
125. Id. at § 3123(1)-(2).
126. Id. at § 2705.
127. Id. at § 903; see Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 796 (Pa. 2015).
128. Rose, 127 A.3d at 796.
129. Commonwealth v. Rose, 81 A.3d 123, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (en banc), aff'd, 127
A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015).
130. Id. Following her death, Allegheny County Medical Examiner Dr. Karl Williams
concluded, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that there was an unbroken chain of
events from the time that Rose and Sadik attacked Mitchell until the day she died. Id. In
other words, despite the fact that Ms. Mitchell died from pneumonia, her death was a direct
result of her weakened state from being in a coma for fourteen years, which left her unable
to fight off the pneumonia. While causation could well be an issue in other delayed death
cases, it is not an argument Rose has chosen to bring on appeal, and is therefore not discussed
in this article.
131. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2501(A).
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on Mitchell.132 After a six-day trial, the jury found Rose guilty of
third-degree murder.133
The case then proceeded to the sentencing phase, which raised
various questions regarding the appropriate sentencing guidelines
to apply to the third-degree murder charge. When Rose and Sadik
assaulted Mitchell in 1993, the sentencing statute in effect at the
time attached a sentence of ten to twenty years' imprisonment for
the crime of third-degree murder.134 In 1995, the Pennsylvania leg-
islature amended the sentencing guidelines and increased the sen-
tence for third-degree murder to a statutory range of twenty to forty
years' imprisonment.13 5 The trial court ultimately sentenced Rose
to prison for twenty to forty years under the 1995 amended sentenc-
ing guideline because "the applicable guidelines and the statutory
maximums that were in effect on the date of the victim's death
[were] the appropriate ones to apply."136 The trial court's applica-
tion of the new sentencing guideline was seemingly in line with the
general rules of sentencing.137
Rose appealed the legality his third-degree murder sentence to
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania [hereinafter "Superior
Court"], 1 3 8 arguing that he should have been sentenced under the
132. Rose was charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Di-
vision, Docket No. CC-2008-00810.
133. Rose, 127 A.3d at 797. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(c). Pennsylvania defines mur-
der as the following: (a) murder of the first degree is an intentional killing; (b) murder of the
second degree "is committed while [a] defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice
in the perpetration of a felony"; and (c) murder of the third degree is "all other kinds of mur-
der" and shall be a felony of the first degree. Id.
134. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103(1); see also Commonwealth v. Green, 431 A.2d 918, 919-
20 (Pa. 1981) (stating that § 1103 imposed a sentencing range often to twenty years' impris-
onment for the crime of third-degree murder).
135. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102(d).
136. Transcript of Sentencing at 28, Commonwealth v. Rose, No. CP-02-CR-0000810-2008
(Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny Cty. Dec. 7, 2010).
137. As explained by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, "we will continue to expect that
district courts will calculate the applicable sentencing ranges using the Guidelines extant at
the time of sentencing." United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 220 (3d Cir. 2008). Under the
common law and the Calder understanding of the ex post facto clause, "courts must compare
the punishment affixed to the crime at the time of the offense with the punishment affixed
at the time of sentencing. [Only] [i]f the latter is harsher than the former, the court must
apply the punishment in effect at the time of the offense." Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
2072, 2094 (2013). While this is the general rule for federal sentencing, there is no such rule
in Pennsylvania. However, it is not uncommon for the Pennsylvania state judiciary to look
to the Third Circuit for guidance at times. Because the trial court determined that the crime
of murder was not completed until Mitchell's death in 2007-twelve years after the new sen-
tencing guideline took effect-the new sentencing guideline was the "punishment in effect at
the time of the offense." Id.
138. The Superior Court is the intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania, which han-
dles criminal appeals from the Pennsylvania Courts of Common Pleas. THE UNIFIED
JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://www.pacourts.us/learn/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2016).
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more lenient guidelines in effect in 1993, when he attacked Mitch-
ell. 1 3 9 A three-judge panel of the Superior Court agreed and re-
versed the trial court's sentence on the grounds that the application
of the new sentencing guideline was a violation of the ex post facto
clause of both the Pennsylvania1 4 0 and United States Constitu-
tions.1 4 1 This opinion was vacated when the Commonwealth was
granted a rehearing en banc,1 42 but a nine-judge panel again found
for Rose, holding that the statute in effect at the time of the attack
was the proper sentencing guideline.14 3 Judge Susan Gantman filed
a dissenting opinion where she stated that because the crime of
murder is "committed only when the victim of the assault dies[,]"
the trial court's imposition of the heightened sentence was
proper.144
The Commonwealth petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to review the Superior Court's opinion,1 45 which it granted to ad-
dress the following issue:
Whether the Superior Court erred in concluding, as a matter
of first impression, that [Rose] was entitled to a reduced pun-
ishment under the expost facto clause for a murder that he had
yet to commit when the law was changed to increase the pun-
ishment prior to the victim's death?146
Rose asserted that the application of Pennsylvania's amended
sentencing guideline fell within the third Calder category;147 specif-
ically, that the amendment inflicted a greater punishment than
what was annexed to the crime when it was committed.14 8 The
question for the Supreme Court was whether the crime of murder
was "committed" in 1993 for the purposes of the ex post facto
139. Commonwealth v. Rose, 81 A.3d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (en banc), aff'd, 127
A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015).
140. PA. CONST. art. I, § 17 (stating "[n]o ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the
obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities,
shall be passed").
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (applying the Ex Post Facto Clause to the federal govern-
ment); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10 (applying the Ex Post Facto Clause to the state governments).
142. En banc comes from the French term "on the bench;" see En Banc, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). In Pennsylvania, normally three Superior Court judges preside
over an appeal, but a party may move to have the court re-hear the case en banc, meaning
that nine active judges will hear the case instead. PA. R. APP. P. 3103(a)(1).
143. Rose, 81 A.3d at 136.
144. Id. at 136-37 (Gantman, J., dissenting).
145. Commonwealth v. Rose, 95 A.3d 274 (Pa. 2014).
146. Id.
147. Rose, 81 A.3d at 134.
148. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
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clause.149 Essentially, the court addressed whether or not comple-
tion of the crime-which occurred upon Mitchell's death-is neces-
sary for a later enacted sentencing guideline to constitute an ex post
facto law.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the en banc Superior
Court ruling on November 18, 2015.150 Relying on a North Carolina
Supreme Court decision, State v. Detter,15 1 the court found that "'for
purposes of the prohibition against Ex post facto legislation, we hold
that the date(s) of the murderous acts rather than the date of death
is the date the murder was committed."'1 5 2 The Detter decision is
often cited for its premises that (1) the "date of an offense for one
purpose, such as meeting the statutory elements of a crime, may be
different than the date of the offense for another purpose, such as
an ex post facto inquiry[J" 15 3 and (2) choosing between the time a
fatal blow is struck or the time of death for ex post facto purposes
"'should be dictated by the nature of the inquiry.'
15 4
Using Detter as foundation, the Rose court concluded that "the
date on which all of the elements of the statutory crime of third-
degree murder are met, including the death of the victim, is not dis-
positive" in ex post facto analysis.15 5 Rather, the law that should
control is that which is in effect at the time when the criminal ac-
tions are undertaken. The court quoted several United States Su-
preme Court cases and Blackstone to support this conclusion,15 6 be-
fore stating that one of the underlying rationales of the ex post facto
clause, fair notice, is consistent with the acts-based application of
the clause.15 7 After finding that Rose had no fair notice that he
could face a forty-year prison sentence if Mitchell died,15 8 the court
149. Rose, 95 A.3d at 274.
150. Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 807 (Pa. 2015).
151. 260 S.E.2d 567 (N.C. 1979).
152. Rose, 127 A.3d at 801 (quoting State v. Detter, 260 S.E.2d 567, 590 (N.C. 1979).
153. Id. at 802.
154. Id. at 801 (quoting Detter, 260 S.E.2d at 590).
155. Id. at 802-03.
156. See id. (citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925) and De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S.
144 (1960)); id. at 803-04 (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 29 (1977)); id. at 804-05 (citing
Collins v. Youngblood, 467 U.S. 37 (1990) and BLACKSTONE, supra note 2).
157. Id. at 805-06 ("This focus on acts is consistent with one of the Ex Post Fact Clause's
underlying rationales-fair warning.").
158. Id. at 806. This argument seems shaky, as there are so many variables that could
have changed the outcome of this case. The causal chain of events linking Rose to Mitchell's
death could have broken; the District Attorney could have chosen not to bring murder
charges; the jury could have found Rose guilty of first-degree murder instead of third. Based
on the last scenario, it is hard to imagine that Rose was not effectively "on notice" that he
may receive a punishment of forty years in prison. He and his co-defendant beat Mitchell for
nearly half an hour, kicked her more than fifty times, and repeatedly stomped on her head;
at some point, these acts cross over into intentional murder, and Rose would be on notice
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held that "the Commonwealth's focus on the result of an individual's
criminal acts-in this case, the death of the victim-is mis-
placed."159 As the remaining sections of this article will show, the
Rose court's holding is inconsistent with the plain language of the
Calder categories.
First, though, the court's reliance on several cases is misplaced.
For example, the Detter decision involved a law that imposed the
death penalty for the charged crime of first-degree murder.160 In
Detter, the defendant poisoned her husband on various occasions
over the course of several months, during which the highest penalty
for first-degree murder was life imprisonment.161 The victim, how-
ever, did not die from the poisoning until after the death penalty
became the effective punishment, and the North Carolina Supreme
Court held it would violate the ex post facto clause to subject the
defendant to death.162 In relying on Detter, the Rose court failed to
at least make note of the fact that the death penalty may have com-
plicated the ex post facto analysis in Detter simply because "death
is different."163 As the United States Supreme Court has noted,
there is a "'qualitative difference between death and all other pen-
alties,"'164 and it is this difference that makes any case involving the
death penalty effectively have an asterisk next to it when applied
outside the capital punishment realm.165 Because Rose does not in-
volve an ex post facto death penalty statute, the Detter decision
that his crime may, in fact, get him sentenced to life in prison. Thus, I do not find particular
credence in this conclusion made by the court.
159. Rose, 127 A.3d at 807 (emphasis in original).
160. State v. Detter, 260 S.E.2d 567, 572 (N.C. 1979).
161. Id. at 589. The court stated:
[D]efendant committed all of her efforts to kill her husband in January, February and
March, 1977. At that time, the penalty in this State for first-degree murder was life
imprisonment ... The deceased died on 9 June 1977. Our new death penalty statute
... became effective 1 June 1977.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
162. Id.
163. Deborah W. Denno, "Death Is Different" and Other Twists of Fate, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439-40 (1992); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287-89 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring):
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree
but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of
rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.
164. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1006 (1991)).
165. Further analysis of the Detter opinion supports this premise. At the time of the de-
cision, the rule in North Carolina was that "murder is a crime requiring both an act and a
result[,]" and because the crime of murder is not complete until the resulting death occurs,
the crime "occurs" at the time of death. Detter, 260 S.E.2d at 590 (relying on State v. Wil-
liams, 49 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. 1948). But the Detter court rejected this logical rule by finding
that, for ex post facto analysis, "the date(s) of the murderous acts rather than the date of
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should not warrant as much weight as the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court granted it.
The Rose court cited three other cases to bolster its emphasis on
criminal acts over completed crimes:166 People v. Gill,167 State v.
Masino,168 and State v. Debney.169 While these cases are instructive,
they do not implicate the third Calder category, and should not be
treated as particularly persuasive. The Gill and Masino decisions
both involved situations where new crime categories were created
after the commission of the offense.170 This is not analogous to Rose.
Of course, because there is not significant precedent for this issue,
the court must look to analogize where it can, but it also must rec-
ognize distinctions when necessary. The Calder categories are not
a cohesive unit; the analysis or logic of one category does not apply
carte blanch to the three other categories.171 Thus, relying on Gill
and Masino-two cases that do not implicate a third Calder cate-
gory law-is improper. In those two instances, the proper focus
may very well be on criminal acts, but that does not mean that the
same is true for factual scenarios invoking the third category.
Further, in Debney, the issue was not one of ex post facto concern,
but rather was jurisdictional.1 72 The court had to decide where the
murder "occurred" for the purposes of charging the defendant; did
it occur where the blows were inflicted, or where the death physi-
cally occurred?173 In that context, the murder charges were to be
brought in the jurisdiction where the blows were inflicted.174 The
death is the date the murder was committed." Id. The Rose court adopts this same premise,
something that seems counterintuitive. How can a murder be "committed" when the victim
is not dead yet? Like Rose, the defendant in Detter could not have been charged with or
convicted of murder when the old sentencing scheme was in effect. But unlike Rose, Detter's
new sentencing statute imposed the death penalty. It would appear that the Detter court
was unwilling to impose the harshest penalty, and instead relied on the acts-based theory of
ex post facto laws to get around the logical rule of Williams.
166. Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 802-806 (Pa. 2015).
167. 6 Cal. 637 (1856).
168. 43 So.2d 685 (La. 1949).
169. 64 N.W. 446 (Neb. 1895).
170. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798); State v. Masino, 43 So.2d 685, 686 (La.
1949) (noting that defendants committed negligent acts between July of 1940 and May of
1942 that led to the deaths of several persons, but the crime of negligent homicide was not
created until July of 1942); see also Gill, 6 Cal. at 637. Though the Gill decision may appear
facially applicable to Rose, as it also involves the delayed death of the victim, the year of this
decision cannot be ignored. Id. Gill was decided in 1856, when our criminal jurisprudence
was still very much tied to criminal acts, as it was at common law. Id. Since this time,
though, we have moved away from acts-based analysis of crimes, indicating the Rose court
placed significant weight in the outdated logic of Gill.
171. See discussion infra part VI.B.
172. Debney, 64 N.W. 446, 446-47 (Neb. 1895).
173. Id. at 447-48.
174. Id.
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Rose court cited Debney for its own premise immediately after citing
Detter for the idea that a crime may be complete for one purpose but
not for another.175 If we accept Detter's logic, however, the Debney
decision is easily distinguishable from Rose because while it may be
logical for jurisdictional purposes to assign jurisdiction based on
where most, if not all, of the criminal acts took place, it does not
follow that this logic should be extended to the ex post facto realm.
Second, the Rose court cited several United States Supreme
Court decisions to support its conclusion that the High Court in-
tended the ex post facto prohibition to attach to criminal actions,
not just completed crimes.176 Again, though, the Rose court failed
to provide any context for these cases and their holdings. Just as
the ex post facto clause itself is "unintelligible"177 without explana-
tion, the cases the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relies on mean
nothing when taken out of context.17 8 Specifically, the court relied
on Weaver,179 but failed to acknowledge that Weaver only speaks to
completed crimes: "For prisoners who committed crimes before [the
law's] enactment, [the new law] substantially alters the conse-
quences attached to a crime already completed, and therefore
changes 'the quantum of punishment."'18 0 Further, the Weaver
court explained that the statute at issue was "void as applied to pe-
titioner, whose crime occurred before its effective date."181 In Rose,
the crime of murder had not occurred before the effective date of the
new third-degree murder sentencing statute.
Finally, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the United States Supreme Court repeatedly "conflate[s]
the words 'acts' and 'crime' or 'acts' and 'offense' when analyzing
Calder questions,"182 the Rose court continued to treat the high
court's use of the word "acts" as proof that the prohibition against
ex post facto laws apply to criminal acts, not just the completed
175. See Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 802 (2015).
176. Id. at 803-05 (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990)), De Veau v. Braisted,
363 U.S. 144 (1960); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925), and Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S.
24 (1981)).
177. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
178. For example, Beazell did not even implicate the ex post facto clause because the law
in question was procedural in nature. 269 U.S. at 171 (noting the ex post facto provision
"was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legisla-
tion . . . not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not
affect matters of substance").
179. See Rose, 127 A.3d at 803-04.
180. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 33 (emphasis added) (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,
293-94 (1977)).
181. Id. at 36.
182. Rose, 127 A.3d at 805 n.16.
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criminal offense.183 The Rose court cites Beazell, Collins, De Veau,
and Weaver for this idea, but ignores the fact that those cases bla-
tantly use "acts," "offense," and "crimes" interchangeably.18 4 A
criminal action is not synonymous with a completed crime, at least
for the purposes of the third Calder category. As the next section
shows, the Rose court should have made an in depth analysis of the
plain language of the Calder categories on an individualized basis,
rather than applying the logic of the first category to this third-cat-
egory case.
VI. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMONWEALTH V. ROSE
This section sets forth what I believe is a more appropriate anal-
ysis of Rose's ex post facto claim. First, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court could have analyzed the situation as a "straddle offense," ap-
plying one of the approaches to such crimes laid out by several
United States Circuit Courts of Appeal. Second, the Rose court
should have focused more on the literal language of the Calder cat-
egories and the distinctions therein. And third, the court should
have looked to other areas of criminal law where the specific issue
of delayed death has been addressed, rather than simply attempt-
ing to analogize to the other Calder categories.
A. Straddle Offenses and the Competing Approaches to Ex Post
Facto Laws
The time at which an offense is committed lies at the heart of ex
post facto analysis;185 it establishes whether a law is retroactive and
whether the offender was afforded fair notice of the crime and its
punishment.186 Determining when a crime is committed is nor-
mally easy: the crime of robbery is committed when an offender "[il-
legally takes] property from the person of another . .. by violence or
183. Id. at 803-05.
184. Compare Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 168 (1925) (noting that February 13, 1923
was the "date of the offense") with id. at 170 (stating that the law at issue did not "affect the
criminal quality of the act charged") (emphasis added); see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497
U.S. 37, 39 (1990) (noting that the statute in question "was passed after respondent's crime");
id. at 49 (finding that a "law that abolishes an affirmative defense ... [is ex post facto] be-
cause it expands the scope of a criminal prohibition after the act is done.") (emphasis added).
185. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 54 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the "critical importance
of evaluating the [rights of the defendant] by reference to the time of the offense").
186. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (stating these two points as the foundation
of an ex post facto law).
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intimidation."187 All of the elements are committed in a single crim-
inal episode, at a single point in time, constituting what is known
as an instantaneous crime, or a "discrete act."188
However, when the offense in question is not completed at an in-
stant moment in time-for example, when "straddling offenses" are
implicated-determining the point at which the crime is "commit-
ted" for the purposes of the ex post facto clause becomes compli-
cated.189 This is because traditional ex post facto analysis presumes
that the actor has ceased the illegal conduct before the alleged ex
post facto law is enacted.190 At common law, the potential for a
crime to be a "straddle" offense was unfathomable.191 Modern
courts are now faced with deciding how straddle offenses fit into
this traditional understanding of the Calder categories and the pur-
poses of the ex post facto clause, and must decide when a crime is
"committed" for the purposes of ex post facto analysis.192
Straddle offenses involve a single crime, but elements of that
crime are satisfied both before and after a new law either aggra-
vates the crime or increases the punishment for its completion.193
187. Robbery, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ed. 2009).
188. United States v. Bucheit, 134 F. App'x. 842, 853 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Jeffery R.
Boles, Easing the Tension Between Statutes of Limitations and the Continuing Offense Doc-
trine, 7 NW. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y. 219, 227 (2012).
189. Adams, supra note 67, at 238.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rose, 81 A.3d 123, 129 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (en banc),
aff'd, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015).
192. Adams, supra note 67, at 238 ("In Justice Chase's words, [straddle offenses] require[]
a court to determine when an action is finally 'done."'); see also Broughton, supra note 7, at
727 n.35; United States v. Vivit, 214 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[W]hen a defendant
commits crimes that straddle the date of promulgation of new guidelines provisions, the de-
fendant can be punished under a guideline effective after the beginning of the straddle pe-
riod."); United States v. Zimmer, 299 F.3d 710, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]here a defendant's
offense conduct straddles an enactment, the enactment can be applied to the defendant with-
out violating the Ex Post Facto clause even when the enactment would result in a harsher
sentence."); United States v. Reetz, 18 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1994) (With continuing of-
fenses, "the completion date controls which version of the Sentencing Guidelines should ap-
ply.").
193. Adams, supra note 67, at 251. The scope of commentary on straddle offenses and the
ex post facto clause is a limited one. Adams's article analyzes the relationship of straddle
offenses, the ex post facto clause, and the "one-book rule." See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(3) (1992).
The rule requires that when a "defendant is convicted of two offenses, the first committed
before, and the second after, a revised edition of the Guidelines Manual became effective, the
revised edition of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both offenses." Id. This is con-
sistent with the federal mandate requiring application of the Guidelines in effect at the time
of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2012); see also United States v. Stephenson, 921
F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. McMillian, No. 13-3577, 2015 WL 329467, at
*2 (7th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015). The other source Adams' article relies on-Broughton's George
Mason Law Review article, supra note 7-discusses traddle offenses only with respect to the
first Calder category. See Broughton, supra note 7, at 725. While neither Broughton nor
Adams's articles address ex post facto issues identical to the one here, their general premises
and logic are nonetheless persuasive.
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Courts have unanimously held that imposing a later-enacted in-
creased punishment is not an ex post facto clause violation when
the criminal conduct straddled the law's enactment.194 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court should have recognized the facts of Rose as
a straddle offense,1 9 5 and approached the issue in light of the two
competing approaches to such offenses: the Completion Approach
and the Continuing Offense Approach.19 6 This section explains the
two approaches, and concludes which is the most useful in analyz-
ing the issue presented in Rose.
1. The Completion Approach
Under the Completion Approach, the ex post facto clause is not
violated when a law is applied to a crime that was incomplete at the
time that the law was enacted.1 9 7 The logic behind this approach is
that if some of the elements of a crime are committed before the new
statute is effective, but other elements are only completed after the
date of enactment, then there can be no ex post facto violation be-
cause the defendant heoretically could have refrained from com-
pleting the remaining elements of the crime.198 The defendant can-
not then bend the Constitution to his will to claim an ex post facto
violation when he actively chose to complete the crime. On the
other hand, if all of the elements of a crime are completed but the
194. Adams, supra note 67, at 252. For cases addressing this issue at the federal level,
see generally United States v. Regan, 989 F.2d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Where a 'continuing
offense' straddles the old and new law . .. applying the new is recognized as constitutionally
sound."); United States v. Ferrara, 458 F.2d 868, 874 (2d Cir. 1972) (no ex post facto violation
for a conspiracy straddling offense); United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 198 (3d Cir.
2003) (no ex post facto violation for a fraud straddling offense); United States v. Manges, 110
F.3d 1162, 1172 (5th Cir. 1997) (mail fraud); Vivit, 214 F.3d at 917; Zimmer, 299 F.3d at 717-
18; United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 365 (9th Cir. 1975) (racketeering conspiracy).
For cases addressing this issue at the state level, see generally People v. Grant, 973
P.2d 72 (Cal. 1999) (child molestation); People v. Chilelli, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 400, (Cal.
Ct. App. 2014) (stalking); People v. Williams, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 569, 570 (2004) (continued
theft crimes); People v. Dalton, 70 P.3d 517, 521 (Colo. App. 2002) (sexual abuse); Ivey v.
Chiles, 604 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (RICO).
195. The court simply stated in a footnote that the facts of Rose maybe a straddle offense.
Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 800 n.14 (Pa. 2015). But Rose is an exemplar of what
a straddle crime is; some elements of his crime were completed, while one or more were not.
It is unclear why the Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose not to address the issue as a strad-
dle offense.
196. See generally Broughton, supra note 7, at 745. Broughton also refers to the Contin-
uing Offense Approach as the "elemental approach." Id. For the purposes of this article and
for clarity, I will only refer to this approach as the "Continuing Offense Approach." Brough-
ton actually discusses the three ways courts have treated straddle crimes and the ex post
facto clause: "(1) those that employ the completion approach; (2) those that employ the con-
tinuing-offense doctrine; and (3) those that avoid the ex post facto claim by interpreting the
statute to apply only prospectively." Broughton, supra note 7, at 725.
197. Id. at 727.
198. See Dalton, 70 P.3d at 520-21; United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1991).
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resultant criminal effect has not occurred yet at the time of the leg-
islation's enactment, the defendant can do nothing to prevent the
criminal result from occurring.199
The Completion Approach is seemingly in line with the United
States Supreme Court's ruling in Weaver v. Graham,200 where the
court held that the critical inquiry in ex post facto decisions is
whether the law increases the punishment for events completed be-
fore its effective date.201 The language of Weaver suggests that
every element of the crime must be completed prior to enactment of
the new law for it to truly fall within the universally accepted "ret-
roactive increase in punishment" definition of ex post facto laws.2 0 2
However, the Completion Approach has only been considered in
cases where the unsatisfied element or elements required that the
defendant take an affirmative criminal act to complete the crime.
In United States v. Dixon,203 Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh
Circuit enunciated the crux of the Completion Approach:
If all the acts required for punishment are committed before
the criminal statute punishing the acts takes effect, there is
nothing the actor can do to avoid violating the statute, and the
twin purposeS204 of the ex post facto clause are engaged. But
by the same token as long as at least one of the acts took place
later, the clause does not apply.205
Courts following the Completion Approach are unwilling to find
an ex post facto violation where the defendant is on notice as to the
criminality of his conduct and the punishments attached thereto,
yet still chooses to take an affirmative criminal action to complete
the crime.206 For example, in United States v. Alkins,207 the Second
199. See United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010).
200. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
201. Id. at 31.
202. See Broughton, supra note 7, at 728.
203. 551 F.3d 578.
204. Id. at 584. According to the Seventh Circuit, the ex post facto clause:
[B]oth enforces the principle that legislation is prospective, whereas punishment-the
job assigned by the Constitution to the judicial branch-is retrospective, and gives
people a minimal sense of control over their lives by guaranteeing that as long as they
avoid an act in the future they can avoid punishment for something they did in the
past, which cannot be altered.
Id. Essentially, the Seventh Circuit agrees that the foundational purposes of the ex post facto
clause are providing fair notice and restricting vindictive government action.
205. Id. at 584-85; see also Broughton, supra note 7, at 731 n. 65.
206. See United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1991).
207. Id.
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Circuit found no ex post facto clause violation because the defend-
ants were on notice of the crime and its sentence208 and "permitted"
the final element of the crime to be satisfied.209 The mail fraud
crime in Alkins was not completed until the letters were actually
mailed-something that had not yet taken place when the new
Guideline became effective.210 The Second Circuit held that the de-
fendants could have prevented the crime from being completed,211
but instead, defendants "acquiesced," and allowed the final element
to be committed.212
While Broughton states that this approach looks at whether all
of the elements are completed before the effective date of the new
law, 2 13 in effect, the Completion Approach asks a different question.
As evidenced by the Seventh Circuit's application of the theory, the
real inquiry seems to be whether all of the criminal acts were com-
pleted prior to the new law's enactment.214 Note how Judge Posner
specifically uses the word "acts," not merely "elements," in his ex-
planation of the approach.215 Although the passive voice used by
the Second Circuit in Alkins suggests that an affirmative criminal
act is not required to avoid violation of the ex post facto clause, the
court still focused exclusively on the defendant's active decision to
complete the crime, despite the increased punishment.216 Rose
made no such choice in this case-all of his choices were made in
1993.217 Of course, this distinction may simply be more apparent
because the completion approach has only been applied to crimes
208. This harkens back to the key purpose of the prohibition of ex post facto laws: to en-
sure citizens have fair notice of the laws and their penalties. Alkins, 925 F.2d at 549.
209. Id. ("Since appellants permitted the final element of the crime to occur after the ef-
fective date of the statute" the ex post facto clause was not violated); see Broughton, supra
note 7, at 731.
210. Alkins, 925 F.2d at 549.
211. Id.
212. Id. Broughton also discusses a "modified" Completion Approach used by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Monaco, 194 F.3d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1999). Broughton, supra note
7, at 732. In Monaco, the court held that if a reasonable jury could have convicted solely on
pre-enactment conduct, then there is an ex post facto violation. Monaco, 194 F.3d at 386. As
Broughton points out, this modified approach is confusing, because if a defendant could have
potentially been convicted solely based on the pre-enactment criminal conduct, there is no
straddle offense because, presumably, the crime was completed and a straddling offense did
not exist. Broughton, supra note 7, at 732. This confusion shows the difficulty surrounding
straddle crimes and their potential ex post facto implications; courts are unsure how to rec-
oncile the Calder categories and continuing offenses.
213. Broughton, supra note 7, at 725.
214. See United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2008), re'd on other grounds
sub nom Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010) ("If all the acts required for punishment
are committed before the criminal statute punishing the acts takes effect, there is nothing
the actor can do to avoid violating the statute.").
215. Id.
216. See Alkins, 925 F.2d at 549.
217. See Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 796-97 (Pa. 2015).
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that inherently require additional acts to complete the crime, un-
like the situation in Rose. Still, the approach is premised on the
idea that after new legislation is effective, a defendant has the
choice not to go through with the crime. If he choses to affirmatively
act in completion of the crime, then the new, harsher punishment
applies, free and clear of potential ex post facto violations.218
2. The Continuing Offense Approach
The second approach to straddle crimes is the Continuing Offense
Approach, which is based off of the continuing offense doctrine.219
The doctrine circumvents statutes of limitation by beginning the
tolling period not when the elements of the offense are first met, but
when the offense is terminated.220 Under the continuing offense
approach to straddle crimes, if the crime in question is defined as a
''continuing offense," and the course of criminal conduct continues
past the new law's enactment, then the ex post facto clause is not
implicated.221
A continuing offense refers to a course of criminal conduct that
spans over an extended period of time.2 22 The most common exam-
ple of a continuing offense is a conspiracy.223 In a conspiracy, the
elements of conspiracy are completed on the day that the concert of
action begins. But the conspiracy is not terminated; rather, it con-
tinues to exist through the completion of the crime for which the
conspiracy was formed, should that ever occur. Like the completion
approach, for a straddle crime to fall outside of the scope of the ex
post facto clause under the continuing offense theory, the defendant
must take an affirmative criminal action after the enactment of the
new law.2 2 4 This seemingly puts the facts of Commonwealth v. Rose
outside of the realm of continuing offenses, as Rose did not actively
engage in an ongoing course of criminal conduct with respect to
Mitchell's murder.225
218. See Broughton, supra note 7, at 729.
219. Id. at 736-37.
220. Boles, supra note 188, at 221.
221. Broughton, supra note 7, at 732.
222. Boles, supra note 188, at 228.
223. Broughton, supra note 7, at 732; see also Boles, supra note 188, at 233 ("Conspiracy
is widely recognized as the classic example of a continuing offense ... because the conspira-
tors' ongoing actions in pursuit of their conspiratorial agreement cause harm that lasts as
the course of conduct persists.").
224. United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541, 549 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[There is no question that
the basic conduct in question was criminal under state law. Having committed it, appellants
were not powerless to prevent the consequences of their actions.").
225. See Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 796-97 (Pa. 2015).
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If the facts of Rose do not represent a continuing offense, we must
ascertain what ype of offense is at play. Crimes are classified ac-
cording to their nature as either continuing or instantaneous.2 2 6 An
instantaneous crime is one that occurs at a single and immediate
point in time;227 unlike continuing offenses, which involve a course
of conduct, an instantaneous offense is a "discrete act."228 Further,
Congress can specifically define certain crimes as continuing, or the
United States Supreme Court may similarly do so if it finds that
the crime is of such a nature that "Congress must assuredly have
intended that it be treated as a continuing one."2 2 9
Yet the facts of Rose do not seem to fit in either of these classifi-
cations of criminal law. Rose did not participate in a course of crim-
inal conduct, nor are the crimes of assault and murder deemed con-
tinuing by the legislature. But in no way did the harm Rose in-
flicted end at the moment of injury, either.230 While Rose's actions
were completed, the injurious force of his attack was still working
to produce its fatal effect.231 With respect to his criminal liability,
it is as if he had been continuously "pressing" his injurious force
upon Ms. Mitchell for fourteen years.232 This in no way reflects an
instantaneous crime.
3. Best Approach for Commonwealth v. Rose
Because courts have only addressed straddle offenses with re-
spect to offenses that require some affirmative criminal act to sat-
isfy the remaining elements,233 when attempting to fit the round
226. Boles, supra note 188, at 227.
227. Id.
228. United States v. Bucheit, 134 F. App'x 842, 853 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Boles, supra
note 188, at 227.
229. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970); see Broughton, supra note 7, at
732.
230. Boles, supra note 188, at 227-28 ("The harm which [an instantaneous offense] causes
occurs in that moment and does not continue beyond it.... A battery transpires, for instance,
at the moment when the perpetrator's closed fist makes contact with a victim's body. The
crime and its attendant harm cease when the perpetrator removes his fist from the victim's
body.").
231. State v. Littlefield, 70 Me. 452, 459 (1880) ("The force was acting to produce its effect,
and the defendant was as much responsible for its natural and necessary result as if he had
all the while been pressing it upon the body of the victim.").
232. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 796 (Pa. 2015).
233. For example, in a mail fraud case, the "crime is completed when the offending letter
is mailed." United States v. Manges, 110 F.3d 1162, 1172 (5th Cir. 1997). In mailing the
letters and thus completing the crime, the criminals take an affirmative criminal action;
when this affirmative criminal action takes place after a new sentence is enacted, there is no
ex post facto violation. Compare this with the situation in Commonwealth v. Rose. Rose took
no affirmative criminal action after the third-degree murder sentence was aggravated-his
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peg of Rose into the square hole of the completion or continuing of-
fense approach, we must examine the competing approaches in
light of their potential applicability beyond their current, limited
scope. In a situation such as the case at bar-where the criminal
actions are completed but the consequences are not, and within the
consequences another, separate crime is committed-the continu-
ing offense approach is the most applicable for two reasons.
First, while both approaches are fairly acts driven, the Comple-
tion Approach is the more "acts-based" of the two, with the Second,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits all focusing on whether all of the "acts,"
not elements, required for the crime are completed.234 The Contin-
uing Offense Approach offers more flexibility, even within the con-
fines of the "acts" requirement, making it better suited to apply to
Rose.
Second, the underlying purpose of the continuing offense doctrine
points to the applicability of the Continuing Offense Approach be-
yond the realm of conspiracies and other statutorily defined contin-
uing offenses. If we apply the continuing offense doctrine itself to
Rose, the statute of limitations to prosecute Rose for murder would
toll until Mitchell's death in 2007, because until that point an es-
sential element of the crime of murder was not satisfied.235 Thus,
although the crimes in Rose were not continuing, the potential for
criminal liability remained present throughout the entire fourteen-
year period. As such, the Continuing Offense Approach could, and
should, be expanded to encompass straddle offenses where a dis-
crete course of criminal conduct results in an additional, separate
crime.
B. Examining the Plain Language of the Calder Categories in
Light of the Proper Straddle Crime Approach
As noted by the Superior Court, "[n]either the framers nor the
ratifiers of the Pennsylvania or federal constitution contemplated
application of the ex post facto law to the factual situation
herein."2 36 However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should still
have looked primarily to the plain language of the Calder categories
earlier criminal conduct merely had a later-realized consequence. While this is clearly dis-
tinct from the straddle offenses addressed by state and federal courts to date, it begs the
question of whether the ex post facto clause would, and should, extend to circumstances uch
as those present in Rose.
234. See discussion supra Part VI, A.1.
235. Meaning, the statute of limitations for Rose's murder of Mitchell would not begin to
run until the date of her death in 2007, and not on the date that the blows were inflicted.
236. Commonwealth v. Rose, 81 A.3d 123, 129 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (en banc), affd, 127
A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015).
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in its analysis, as the United States Supreme Court has stated that
proper ex post facto analysis begins with the Calder categories and
the traditional understanding of the ex post facto clause.237 In that
same vein, courts must follow the "commonsense understanding"238
of the Calder categories and the underlying purposes of the clause
itself.239 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that "'great
regard should be paid to [the] spirit and intention' of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution,2 4 0 yet this seems to have been lost in Rose,
where the court appears to transpose the language and logic of the
first category upon the third category at issue.
With the spirit of the ex post facto clause in mind, a closer exam-
ination of the Calder categories suggests that there was conscious
thought behind Justice Chase's use of "acts," "commissioned," and
"committed"241 in the text of the first, second and third, and fourth
categories, respectively.242 This reading of Calder further favors
adoption of the Continuing Offense Approach in Rose.
1. Criminal Acts Are Not Synonymous With Completed
Crimes
The first Calder category applies only to actions done before the
passing of the law, the second and third categories apply to commit-
ted crimes, and the fourth category applies to offenses when com-
missioned.243 With respect to the third category specifically, Rose
argued that the fact that the United States Supreme Court has not
explicitly stated that "committed crimes" is effectually equal with
"completed crimes" functions as conclusive proof that the Court in-
tended to "speak broadly" of conduct, "rather than specifically of a
completed or perfected crime."2 4 4 Rose used this premise to contend
237. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 539 (2000) ("[I]t was a mistake to stray beyond
Calder's four categories" in previous holdings.) (emphasis in original); Collins v. Youngblood,
497 U.S. 37, 49 (1990) ("[D]epature from Calder's explanation of the original understanding
of the Ex Post Facto Clause was, we think, unjustified.").
238. See Carmell, 529 U.S. at 571-72 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
must apply the "commonsense understanding" of the categories); Collins, 497 U.S. at 47.
239. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 571-72 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see also Collins, 497 U.S. at
47 (Ex post facto analysis should be "consistent with the understanding of the term 'ex post
facto law' at the time the Constitution was adopted.").
240. Rose, 81 A.3d at 127 (citing Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Smith, 1817 WL 1771, 5
(Pa. 1817)) (emphasis in original).
241. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1798).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Brief for Appellee at 26, Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015), (No. 26
WAP 2014); id. at 11 ("The Supreme Court has never expressly limited the reach of the ex
post facto prohibition to completed crimes, instead frequently referring to the more expansive
definition referring to past acts, conduct, or activity."). Additionally, simply because the
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that the United States Supreme Court intended for each category
to apply to criminal acts, as the first category does.2 4 5 If the catego-
ries were intended to universally apply only to criminal acts, how-
ever, then Justice Chase's deliberate use of "acts," "committed
crimes," and "commissioned offenses" would be moot.2 4 6 In failing
to recognize this fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not ad-
equately weigh the plain language of the categories.
It is somewhat understandable where the confusion and associa-
tion of "acts" with all of the Calder categories stems from. The first
category is the most well-known, and the most commonly associated
with the ex post facto clause. The first category does reflect the
basic and traditional common law understanding of an ex post facto
law, as Justice Chase adopted almost verbatim the language of
Blackstone.2 47 There is a tendency to regard the categories as a co-
hesive unit, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did, and in so do-
ing unintentionally impose the "acts" framework onto the remain-
ing three categories. But the first category is the only one to ad-
dress an "act" because this kind of law inherently does not involve
a crime that could potentially be completed;248 rather, the focus in
the first category is on an act, "innocent when done," which is ret-
roactively criminalized.249 Further, the identical language and
United States Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to address the narrow issue of
whether "committed crimes" means "completed crimes" does not mean the Court would not
do so in the future. The Commonwealth petitioned for certiorari in February, so perhaps the
Court will address this issue in the near future. Pennsylvania v. Rose, No. 15-1036 (U.S.
Feb. 17, 2016).
245. Brief for Appellee at 21, Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015), (No. 26
WAP 2014) (relying on De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960), for the premise that it "is
clear that it is past acts, conduct, or activity which are subject to the constitutional provision
forbidding ex post facto laws contained in Art. I, § 10 of the United States Constitution."); id.
at 16-17 ("the focus of ex post facto analysis from the earliest days of this country has been
on 'acts') (internal quotations omitted). Rose bases these two arguments on the idea that
the Calder categories are not intended to be rigid or formalistic, but should reflect the "flex-
ibilities in the history" of the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Id. at 34.
246. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
247. See supra note 42. "[W]hen after an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the
legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment
upon the person who has committed it." BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *46. "Every law that
makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action." Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
248. Arguably, though, even the first category inherently requires that the innocent act
reflect a completed version of the later-enacted crime. For example, if theft was legal today,
and I took a friend's car with the intent to return it later, I would not be guilty of theft if the
legislature criminalized it tomorrow and charged me. Because I did not intend to perma-
nently deprive my friend of the car, an element of the crime is unsatisfied, and thus the crime
is incomplete.
249. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
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structure of the second and third categories,250 which is strikingly
similar to the language of the fourth category,251 stands in stark
contrast to the "acts" language in the first category. Taken to-
gether, this suggests that the first category is the only one that is
acts based, and that the categories must be regarded as distinct and
individual-not a cohesive unit.
With respect to the second and third Calder categories, a viola-
tion must require a completed crime, primarily because the ques-
tion of whether new legislation retroactively aggravates a crime or
punishment suggests that a completed criminal offense already oc-
curred.252 In the second and third Calder categories, the offender is
presumed to know that his conduct is criminal and what his poten-
tial punishment is at the time he commits his crime. He is only
believed to be unaware that later aggravation or increase of the
punishment is possible. This is wholly distinct from the first cate-
gory, where an offender's legal conduct is later criminalized and he
is never on notice of any potential punishment.253
Much of the case law interpreting the ex post facto clause lends
itself to this interpretation, as well.2 5 4 In Beazell v. Ohio,2 5 5 the
United States Supreme Court described an ex post facto law as one
that "makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its
commission."2 5 6 More recently, in Collins v. Youngblood257 the
Court held that the ex post facto clause applies to a defendant who
"committed" a crime prior to the passage of the violating law. 2 5 8 De-
spite what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded, these deci-
250. The second Calder category prohibits laws that aggravate a crime "or make[ ] it
greater than it was, when committed." Id. (emphasis added). The third Calder category
prohibits laws that inflict a greater punishment than "the law annexed to the crime, when
committed." Id. (emphasis added).
251. The fourth Calder category prohibits laws that alter the rules of evidence from those
required "at the time of the commission of the offense." Id. (emphasis added). Compare this,
and the previous footnote, with the structure and language of the first category: "Every law
that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action." Id. (emphasis added).
252. See Broughton, supra note 7, at 728. Presumably any completed crime requirement
found in the second and third categories would also extend to the fourth, as "commissioned"
is defined as "an act of committing something," making the terms effectively synonymous.
Commission, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). See Committed, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (defining "committed" as "to carry into action deliber-
ately"; "to do something").
253. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
254. See generally Kring v. State of Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883); Beazell v. Ohio, 269
U.S. 167 (1925); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
255. 269 U.S. 167 (1925).
256. Id. at 169 (emphasis added).
257. 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
258. Id. at 48.
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sions properly focus on when the crime itself was actually commit-
ted, and not necessarily on when the criminal acts are finished.259
This, in turn, supports adoption of the Continuing Offense Ap-
proach when analyzing straddle crimes because that theory is also
concerned specifically with when the offense "terminates," not when
the actions of the offender are completed.
The conclusion that the focus of the second and third Calder cat-
egories is the completion of the crime at issue is further bolstered
by the two requirements of an ex post facto law: (1) that it be retro-
active, and (2) that it disadvantage the defendant.260 Retroactivity
is not an issue presently, but there are questions about whether a
defendant can be disadvantaged if an incomplete crime is subject to
the prohibition against ex post facto laws. With an incomplete
crime, the defendant could not have been exposed to criminal liabil-
ity for the crime, so how can he claim a law that, realistically, did
not actually apply to him, disadvantages him? If, for example, an
individual mails a letter containing Anthrax with the requisite
criminal intent to kill the letter's recipient, his criminal acts are
completed once he places the letter in the mailbox. But, until the
recipient dies from the Anthrax, the would-be defendant is not
guilty of the crime of murder, only of the fully-completed lesser-in-
cluded offenses. If the sentencing scheme for murder changed be-
tween the time of mailing and the time that the recipient-victim
dies, and the individual then raised a third Calder category ex post
facto violation, he would not be entitled to relief because he was
never exposed to the murder sentence, and thus was not disadvan-
taged by the change. The case is the same with Rose: he could not
have been tried for murder-third degree or otherwise-at he time
that the less punitive penalty controlled. He was not guilty of the
crime of murder until Mitchell died in 2007.261 Therefore, Rose's
factual scenario does not lend itself to an ex post facto analysis be-
cause the relevant law was imposed before the crime in question
was completed.
As stated in Weaver v. Graham,262 the critical question in ex post
facto determinations is "whether the new provision imposes a
greater punishment after the commission of the offense, not merely
whether it increases a criminal sentence."263 Because increasing a
259. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 54, 58 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the "critical im-
portance of evaluating the [rights of the defendant] by reference to the time of the offense").
260. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
261. Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 796 (Pa. 2015).
262. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
263. Id. at 32, n.17 (emphasis added); see also Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937).
485
Duquesne Law Review
criminal sentence would satisfy the disadvantaged requirement,
the language of the Weaver holding suggests that the commission of
the offense is an added requirement for ex post facto violations.
Thus, it is clear that the words "commission" or "committal" of the
criminal offense are not just cursory, explanatory language. Ra-
ther, the use of these specific words in each specific category holds
meaning: in the third category at least, completed criminal acts are
insufficient to give rise to an ex post facto violation. For a statutory
change in punishment to constitute an ex post facto law, the crime
in question must be fully completed at the time that the new law is
enacted.
2. Abrogation of the Year and a Day Rule
The evolution of Pennsylvania criminal law also supports focus-
ing on the completeness of the crime over the completeness of the
criminal acts for the purposes of ex post facto analysis. At common
law, the rule for delayed death264 cases like Mitchell's was the "year
and a day rule."2 6 5 Under the rule, if death did not occur within one
year and one day of the infliction of the injurious blows, there arose
"an irrebuttable presumption of law that the death [was] attributa-
ble to some other cause[,] and the person who inflicted the [initial]
injury [was] not punishable for murder or manslaughter."2 6 6 The
primary purpose of the year and a day rule was tied to causation:
in the times of rudimentary science, the cause of death was difficult
to determine after an extended period of time. 2 67 The rule set the
cutoff for causation for homicides at one year and one day from the
infliction of the blows, noting that if the victim died at some point
264. The term "delayed death" comes from double jeopardy analysis, and refers to situa-
tions where a victim dies from physical injuries resulting from an earlier assault. People v.
Rivera, 456 N.E. 2d 492, 494 (N.Y. 1983). There is an exception to the double jeopardy "pro-
hibition against separate prosecutions for two offenses based on the same act or criminal
transaction, in cases of delayed death where the victim subsequently dies from the physical
injuries resulting from the 'assault or the other offense' for which the assailant was previ-
ously prosecuted." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). See discussion infra Part
VI.C.
265. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 166 A.2d 501, 503 (Pa. 1960) ("[I]n prosecutions for murder
the year and a day rule runs from the time the fatal blow was given or the cause of death
administered . . . this rule, so interpreted, was part of the common law of England in and
before 1776.").
266. Id. at 506 (internal citations omitted). The year and a day rule, however, is "one
simply of criminal evidence." Id. at 504 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The rule
was never a part of the definition of murder. Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 796 n.7
(Pa. 2015).
267. Ladd, 166 A.2d at 506; see generally State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. 1999).
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after that, the cause of death could not properly be discerned or at-
tributed to an offender.268
The year and a day rule reflects our gravitation toward finality.
Our justice system dislikes the idea that an individual could poten-
tially live his life wondering if he is going to be tried for a crime
from his past.269 Further, the strict common law punishment for
murder was death,270 and the year and a day rule tempered this
punishment by barring prosecution for murder or manslaughter
stemming from an earlier criminal assault or attack when the cause
of death was not easily discernable.271
The rule-like many common law criminal procedures-focused
solely on the criminal action, and not on the crime itself. At its
simplest, the year and a day rule found criminal liability to be teth-
ered to the defendant's affirmative criminal action, not the result-
ing consequences of that action. Pennsylvania's abrogation of this
rule in 1960 represented a critical shift away from this "act-based"
line of thinking.272 Much like the first Calder category,273 the com-
mon law rule focused on when the blows were inflicted, i.e. when
the criminal "act" took place. Abrogating the year and a day rule
signifies that Pennsylvania has moved away from imposing crimi-
nal liability based on criminal acts, and is instead embracing a re-
sults-based analysis and application.
C. Double Jeopardy Analysis and the Ex Post Facto Clause
Instead of trying to analogize cases based off of "acts versus
crime," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should have compared
Rose to other delayed death cases. One body of case law that has
dealt with delayed death cases is double jeopardy jurisprudence. 274
268. Ladd, 166 A.2d at 502-03.
269. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
270. Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97
U. PENN. L. REV. 756, 760 (1949).
271. Id. at 514.
272. See Id. In abrogating the year and a day rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted
that "a rule becomes dry when its supporting reason evaporates." Id. at 506. With advances
in medical technology, the underlying rationale for the year and a day rule became moot-
any doubt that the original injurious blows were the cause of death was by and large elimi-
nated. People v. Legeri, 266 N.Y.S. 86, 88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933). The Court held that the
modern rule governing delayed death situations "should be based on causation in light of the
current knowledge . . . [and it] is therefore not a strange idea to put no restriction of time
upon the death of the victim and to require only proof of causation of conventional quality at
the trial." Ladd, 166 A.2d at 506.
273. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798); see supra note 58.




The double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses are both "fundamen-
tal" to American legal tradition, and cases implicating these clauses
use similar analyses, stemming from their common emphasis on "fi-
nality" and a prisoner's constitutional "right to preserve settled ex-
pectations."275
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of delayed
death and its possible double jeopardy implications in its 1912 de-
cision Diaz v. United States,276 which involved a nearly identical
factual scenario to Rose. In Diaz, the defendant inflicted bodily in-
juries on the victim during a fight,2 7 7 and was subsequently charged
with and convicted of assault.278 A month later, the victim died as
a result of that attack and the defendant was charged with his mur-
der.279 The defendant argued that this violated his right against
double jeopardy because he had already been tried for the assault
stemming from the same instantaneous event.280
The Diaz court found that even though the crimes of assault and
murder were "identical in some of their elements," and stemmed
from the same criminal episode, the crimes were nonetheless "dis-
tinct offenses in both law and in fact."2 8 1 Critically, the court em-
phasized that death is an essential element of the crime of murder;
an element hat is not present in an assault.282 Because death did
not occur until after the defendant's assault trial, that trial did not
jeopardize him of being exposed to a second trial for the crime of
murder, as the crime of homicide was not committed until the death
occurred.283
This logic is similarly recognized at common law: "The injury
which causes death is never regarded as constituting the crime of
murder or manslaughter."2 8 4 Critically, "[t]he injury must be fol-
lowed by an actual death."2 8 5 State courts, including Pennsylvania,
have also adopted this reasoning. In Commonwealth u. Ra-
munno,286 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated the seem-
ingly simple idea that "[m]urder is committed only when the victim
275. Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 758-59 (4th Cir. 1999); see Commonwealth v.
Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 619 (1999).
276. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).




281. Id. at 448-49.
282. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1912).
283. Id. at 449.
284. Chapman v. People, 39 Mich. 357, 360 (Mich. 1878).
285. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 166 A.2d 501, 516 (Pa. 1960).
286. 68 A. 184 (Pa. 1907).
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of the assault dies[,]" 2 8 7 and further held that when the defendants
in that case were tried for assault, "they were tried for the only of-
fense they had committed up to that time. When they were tried. .
. for murder, it was for an offense of which they were [previously]
guiltless."288
The Ramunno court relies on the Maine Supreme Court's deci-
sion in State v. Littlefield,289 which builds upon the Supreme Court's
logic in Diaz. The Littlefield court found that the defendant's mur-
der prosecution was not a double jeopardy violation because even
though "the force had been inflicted on the body," the event that
triggers a murder charge-actual death of the victim-had not en-
sued.290 The Littlefield court further added that "[t]he force was
acting to produce its effect, and the defendant was as much respon-
sible for its natural and necessary result as if he had all the while
been pressing it upon the body of the victim." 2 9 1
In holding that, until the victim died, "the only crime for which
[the defendant] could then be punished was the crime of felonious
assault,"292 the Ramunno court recognized two critical things: first,
that a defendant is not in jeopardy of being tried for the same of-
fense twice when the latter offense requires an essential element
not needed to complete the former offense; and second, that the
word "committed" is synonymous with "completed crime."2 93
The Pennsylvania legislature identifies double jeopardy viola-
tions as: (i) "any offense of which the defendant could have been
convicted on the first prosecution"; and (ii) "any offense based on
the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such
offense was known to the prosecuting officer at the time of the com-
mencement of the first trial. . . ."294 Undoubtedly, the crimes com-
mitted by Rose stem from the same criminal episode, but the facts
at bar do not fit under either of these two categories of prosecution
prohibited by the double jeopardy statute. Further, double jeopardy
decisions acknowledge that the crime of murder is not committed
until the victim dies.2 9 5 This reasoning has never had to be applied
to an ex post facto situation before now.
287. Id. at 185.
288. Id.
289. 70 Me. 452 (1880).
290. Id. at 459.
291. Id.
292. Ramunno, 68 A. at 185.
293. Id.
294. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 110 (1995).
295. See Littlefield, 70 Me. at 459.
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The facts of Rose can be analogized to the throwing of a ball: the
act of throwing the ball is not complete when it leaves the hand of
the thrower; rather, it is considered "completed" once the ball stops
moving. Rose's criminal act began in 1993 when he attacked Mary
Mitchell, but the murder was not completed until her death in 2007.
Logically, it would seem that even though Rose "threw the ball" in
1993, it did not stop moving until 2007. Therefore, the fact that he
was charged with and convicted of a lesser crime is irrelevant.
Much like the Ramunno double jeopardy case, in 1993, Rose was
tried "for the only offenses [he] had committed up to that time."2 9 6
After Mitchell's death, he was tried for murder-"an offense of
which [he was previously] guiltless."297
When the case at bar is reexamined through the double jeopardy
lens, the "delayed death" scenario gives rise to a pseudo-continuing
offense that would thus not implicate the ex post facto clause.
There are two distinct crimes involved in delayed death cases, yet
only one discrete criminal episode. When the law does not find a
double jeopardy violation in the prosecution of both of these crimes,
it follows that there should be no ex post facto violation should the
law change during the delay of death.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The traditional understanding of the ex post facto clause, its un-
derlying purposes, and its interpretive Calder categories suggest
that every element of a crime must be completed before the enact-
ment of a retrospective law to constitute an ex post facto violation.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court instead found that the focus of
the ex post facto clause was on criminal acts, not completed crimes.
This holding was premised on several inapplicable cases, and the
failure to recognize that the United States Supreme Court continu-
ally conflates the words "acts," "crimes," and "offenses" in its ex post
facto line of cases. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court should have
instead looked directly to the text of Calder v. Bull, and noted Jus-
tice Chase's intentional use of "action" only in the first category.
When a crime straddles the enactment of a new, allegedly ex post
facto law, and no affirmative criminal act must be taken to complete
the crime, as was the case here, courts should instead turn to the
Continuing Offense Approach and the double jeopardy clause for
guidance. Under the framework of the continuing offense doctrine,
296. Cf. Ramunno, 68 A. at 185.
297. Id.
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read in conjunction with the relevant "delayed death" analysis con-
ducted within the double jeopardy context, Rose's situation does not
give rise to an ex post facto claim. While he was disadvantaged,
and the statute is applied retroactively, the underlying purposes
and foundation of the ex post facto clause is not at play in his case.
He completed the crime of murder upon Mitchell's death in 2007, a
crime for which he could not have been prosecuted at any time prior;
therefore, the new sentencing guidelines were the proper statute
under which he should be sentenced.

